According to the Serious Fraud Office press release, in 1999 a contract valued at $39.97 million for the supply of a radar defence system for Dar-es-Salaam International Airport was agreed upon between British Aerospace Defence Systems Ltd and the government of Tanzania. According to the release, BAE often utilized “overt” and “covert” advisors for marketing purposes. To ensure confidentially, Red Diamond Trading Company was set up in the British Virgin Islands to make payments to the latter “covert” advisors.

A Tanzanian local businessman, Shailesh Vithlani, was recruited to advise BAE on its negotiations with the government on the radar contract. Shortly before the contract was signed two new adviser arrangements with Vithlani were concluded- one between Red Diamond and a Vithlani-controlled Panama company, Envers Trading Corporation. This was a 'covert' arrangement where the fee for Vithlani's services was to be not more than 30.025% of the radar contract price. The other arrangement was 'overt' and was for 1% of the radar contract value for services to BAE by a Vithlani-controlled BVI business, Merlin International, not involving Red Diamond. According to the release, between 2000 and 2005 around $12.4 million was paid to Vithlani's two companies. BAE has accepted that there was a high probability that part of this sum would be used to favour it in the contract negotiations. The payments were not subject to proper scrutiny and it was not possible for any person auditing the accounts to investigate and determine whether the payments were properly accounted for or were lawful.

In sentencing BAE, the Judge viewed that BAE were concealing from the auditors and the public that they were making payments to Vithlani; 97% of them via two offshore companies, with the intention that he should have free rein to make such payments to such people as he thought fit in order to secure the radar contract for BAE but that BAE did not want to know the details. The release further stated that the Judge took into account in sentencing BAE that the group had committed itself to a process of change following the Report of Lord Woolf and that BAE would be making a payment for the benefit of the people of Tanzania of £30 million less the fine. The Judge said that the people of Tanzania were the real victims. The Judge decided in these circumstances to impose a fine of £500,000.

According to the May- September 2009 issue of Tanzanian Affairs (Issue 90 "Former President Mkapa,” issued by the Britain-Tanzania Society), “[f]ormer President Mkapa remains under attack in the Swahili press for what they allege was his purchase, with his then Minister of Energy and Minerals Daniel Yona, of the Kiwira Coal Mine at a ‘giveaway price.’ Two newspapers owned by Tanzania’s most prominent businessmen Reginald Mengi – Kuli Koni and ‘This Day’ have launched what appears to be a crusade against Mkapa and are alleging that he has been involved in several other corruption cases. One cartoonist had Mkapa busy extinguishing the ‘fire’ in Kenya (he was part of the AU team working on the Kenya crisis) while reporters ask him about the BoT scandal. Meanwhile Daniel Yona challenged anyone who wants to prosecute him to go ahead. Talking to Nipashe he said that if there were individuals or groups wishing to prosecute him they could do so. He said he was the victim of a smear campaign though he agreed that he had shares in the mine."

Furthermore, according to September-December issue of Tanzanian Affairs (Issue 94 "THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE"), there were several new developments: “Following China’s contribution to the construction of the Shs 4.2 million mine in the early 1980s it soon ground to a halt before former President Mkapa’s administration decided to sell it in a controversial deal in which the former president himself with family and partners, was alleged to have bought the mine at a cut-down price. In July 2009 however the Government absolved Mkapa from suspicions surrounding the mine’s sale telling Parliament that the former President withdrew his 200,000 shares from the firm in 2005 after the firm through which he had bought the shares failed to pay for them. This absolved him from accusations that he used his influence as head of state to engineer the failed venture. On June 5 Energy and Minerals Minister William Ngeleja announced that the government had taken back the mine and was determined to implement a project to generate 200 megawatts of electricity within 18 months. Finally, in August, Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda announced that China was going to invest $400 million to revive the mine which was no longer operating.”

According to Global Witness, "President Taylor, an indicted war criminal, has for years been involved in siphoning off revenue from the Liberian logging industry and other income sources, hiding the money in bank accounts outside the country, in order to fund the violent destabilisation of Liberia and neighbouring states.” Global Witness further alleged that "President Charles Taylor does his best to obscure company ownership, making tracing difficult, if not impossible. He ensures maximum hold on the logging industry by having stakes in every logging company operating in Liberia. The most important of these companies is the Oriental Timber Company (OTC), which has President Charles Taylor as 50% stakeholder. While OTC has been listed as logging 43% of concessionable forest, the actual proportion is significantly larger than this at approximately 70%. Gus Kouwenhoven, the managing director of OTC, gets Liberians to start up logging companies that are in fact run by him, due to the fact that it costs 1,000 Liberian dollars for a Liberian to set up a company whereas the cost for an expatriate amounts to 100,000 Liberian dollars." The Global Witness report also contends that the logging companies both directly provided funds to Taylor as well as offering cover for embargo-busting weapons import deals.

According to the United Nations Security Council Report,"[t]he Central Bank of Liberia assessments of final tax figures derived from timber from paper work submitted by each logging company’s production compared with the FDA (Forestry Development Agency) figures suggest a significant diversion of the timber revenue for extra-budgetary activities." The UN Report further notes that "President Taylor has taken a personal interest in the allocation of timber concessions. In January 2000, a new National Forestry Law declared that all forest resources are the property of the Government except for communal and privately owned forest resources that have been developed through artificial regeneration. On 1 July 2000, the Liberian Government issued Executive Order No. 4 “restricting the Ministry of Finance to the collection of 50 per cent of all Land Rental Fees and 98 per cent of all Stumpage fees”. The FDA was mandated to collect the balance. However, the FDA noted that they only collect a small portion of the funds that they are supposed to receive." Finally, the Report states that "[t]he Forestry Development Authority was also empowered to rescind many logging concessions and salvage permits unilaterally. New concessions require final approval by the President of the Republic. During the 1999-2000 season, many authorized concessionaires continued logging but without assurances that they would be allowed to retain their concessions. This uncertainty encouraged rapid cutting and profiteering, without concern for sustainable forestry practices in order to maximize profits in anticipation of losing concessions." (at 70-75)

According to the “Special Audit on Procurement of Passport Issuing Equipment By the Department of Immigration, Office of the Vice-President and Ministry of Home Affairs," Of the Public Accounts Committee to the Kenyan National Assembly, this case centered around fraudulent procurement contracts:

According to the Committee’s report, contracts for Procurement of Passport Issuing Equipment seemed fraudulent because the price of the contract was three times that obtained through restricted tender in 2002. The results of that tender were conveniently cancelled by the former Permanent Secretary Mr. S. Mwaliko, who then proceeded to introduce Anglo Leasing & Finance Ltd (“Anglo Leasing”) into the project. Investigations by the Kenya Anticorruption Commission (KACC) and former Permanent Secretary, Mr. J. Githongo revealed that Anglo Leasing was purportedly registered in the UK and not registered as stated in the contract. It was noted by the Committee that Anglo Leasing is part of an organized, systematic, and fraudulent scheme designed to fleece the government through the so-called special purpose finance vehicles for purported security contracts. The salient features of these contracts are, among others, a) contracts are supply and finance contracts, in which the contractor is purportedly financed by external credit through was is called lease finance, but it is really the government that unwittingly paid upfront for these projects; b) companies used in these contracts are considered to be possibly non-existent; c) the contracts were over-priced due to non-competitive procurement process and it’s possible that a few individuals used different companies as fronts to perpetrate these possible fraud, with the support of government officials; d) 18 contracts (discussed in the Report) of Anglo Leasing nature worth over Kshs. 55 billion were signed by the government between 1997 and 2003. Some of these were completed prior to January 2003 while others were cancelled by the Government.

This period straddled the end of the rule of President Daniel Arap Moi and the election of President Mwai Kibaki in 2003. 12 of the contracts were placed during Moi's term of office, and 6 after Kibaki came to power. According to the report, all of these contracts have many or all of the same suspicious features (inter alia): a) the projects were not subject to the normal public procurement processes as laid down by government circulars prior to 2001 and by regulations since 2001, on the grounds that, among other reasons, the projects were a matter of national security; no due diligence was carried out by the commissioning department or the Finance Ministry on the contracts themselves, the timing of when the contracts were entered into, or the payment structures. In some of the contracts one company is both supplier and "financier". There was no evidence of an arm's length relationship between supplier and so called financier. Frequently financing payments were made in advance of goods and services being supplied, and were thus apparently being used to acquire those goods and services from third parties, thereby making the Government the true financier and the Central Bank of Kenya was never consulted about financing terms.

Investigations have also clearly established that there are also numerous links of personnel, addresses, banking arrangements and other matters in respect of the companies involved in the contracts. Altogether, these contracts involved payment by the various Government Departments involved of nearly $1 billion. Many of the payments were to be made to bank accounts in Switzerland. None of the suppliers had any obvious connection with that jurisdiction, although some were shell companies incorporated there.

According to Kensington v. the Republic of Congo (2005] EWHC 2684 (Comm) JUDGMENT (28 Nov 2005), Kensington International Limited successfully convinced a London Court to “pierce the corporate veil” of companies involved in a chain of oil transactions relating to the sale of oil from the Republic of Congo to 3rd parties that had been initiated out a fear of attachments being placed on the cargo. Kensington said that (companies controlled by Gokana) AOGC and Cotrade were used for the purpose of hiding the fact that the debt due from Glencore was in reality a debt due to the Congo and that SNPC and Cotrade are in any event part of the Congolese State (at paras. 7-8).

The Judge decided that there could in reality have been no arm's length transactions concluded between SNPC/Cotrade on the one hand, (whether concluded through SNPC UK or Cotrade, by Mr Christel or Dr Nwobodo) and Mr Gokana for AOGC/Sphynx Bermuda on the other, declaring, "The position in 2005 speaks for itself. At that stage Mr Gokana was the President and DG of SNPC, operating through its subsidiary Cotrade to sell oil on the market for monies which would find their way into the State treasury. This was apparently done under the framework agreement of 24 January 2005, under which Cotrade either acted as agent for SNPC in selling the cargo or bought it from SNPC and sold it for its own account. Mr Christel is the Congo President’s son and the President and DG of Cotrade and he is supposed to have negotiated with Mr Gokana who was then not wearing his SNPC hat but was acting on behalf of his own private companies AOGC and Sphynx Bermuda. I find that it is unreal to think that there could have been any arm's length negotiation between them in circumstances where Mr Christel would, on the hypothesis being put forward, understand that monies, which would otherwise find their way into the coffers of the State, were going to line Mr Gokana’s private pocket and when both he and Dr Nwobodo were able to negotiate sales directly into the international market, as a result of the experience he had gained at SNPC UK and which Dr Nwobodo had obtained over many years of trading. There cannot have been negotiations for sale at all. I find that this was the position throughout 2003-2005, when Mr Christel is supposed to have been negotiating with Mr Gokana, first at SNPC UK and then from Brazzaville, although it is seen most starkly in 2005."

He further went on to rule that "Mr Gokana orchestrated a chain of transactions between Sphynx Bermuda and SNPC. He had control over all the entities concerned and directed what should take place, including the creation of contractual documents and invoices which were intended to present the appearance of commercial transactions between independently operated companies. This was a fiction. It is plain that this was done for the benefit of the Congo since there is no other reason which could explain it. Wholesale corruption on the part of Mr Gokana was not put forward as an explanation and whilst Kensington suggested that there was some siphoning of monies from the Congo through the use of this structure, it is plain in my judgment that the structure was designed and operated to conceal the fact that it was the Congo, through SNPC/Cotrade, which was selling the oil in the international market and receiving the proceeds for it. Mr Gokana was not activating this scheme primarily for his own benefit but for the benefit of the Congo."

Furthermore, documents obtained from Kensington's investigations and published by Global Witness show that payments were made from Sphynx Bermuda to companies controlled by Mr. Sassou-Nguesso and Mr. Elenga for 'consulting services' and their nominee shareholder/directors regularly accessed these funds to pay for credit card purchases and other incurred expenses. While no criminal charges were filed, in a failed attempt by Denis Christel to have this information removed from the Global Witness website (Long Beach Ltd. & Sassou-Nguesso v Global Witness Ltd. [2007]), an English judge declared that the parties should publicly explain that the transactions shown in the documents “are consistent with his honest performance of his duties as President and Director General of Cotrade and his disclosed personal income. Once there is good reason to doubt the propriety of the financial affairs of a public official, there is a public interest in those affairs being open to public scrutiny."

According to the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Hearing (May 9, 2002), "[b]etween 1991 and 1994, the government of Kenya, which is to say the dictator and his minions, decided to pass a law to give anybody who exported gold out of Kenya a 35 percent rebate of the value of that gold” to diversify the export commodities of Kenya. Upwards estimate of $5 billion was paid out to cronies of the president through this way, but the problem was that- as stated at the Hearing- Kenya has no gold. “When the press and the courageous people of that country went over to Dubai and Switzerland to inspect the dummy corporations that supposedly received this gold, they found none of them. Mr. Moi and his cronies have wealth secreted abroad that is equal to the total national debt of Kenya, which is rated at $8 billion" (at 14-15 of the Subcommittee Hearing “Recovering Dictators’ Plunder which discusses the Goldenberg scam).

Furthermore, according to the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair (“Goldenberg Report”), the Goldenberg Affair “was a series of alleged business deals…revolving round various economic schemes to wit, Export Compensation, Pre-shipment Finance, Retention Accounts, Forex Cs, Spot and Forward Contracts, cheque kiting and outright theft. The transactions were allegedly either illegal or irregular and were regarded as fraudulent." The Report states that the “Affair centered on two companies; Goldenberg International Ltd, and Exchange Bank Limited, which companies had common shareholders and directors, Kamlesh Mansukhlal Damji Pattni and James Kanyotu. Little was known of the former…Mr. Kanyotu, on the other hand was then the Director of Intelligence within the Kenya Police force. He was a well known public figure…” It is unknown how the two came to know each other “so as to have become shareholders and directors of the two companies” (at paras. 44-46). According to the Goldenberg Report conclusion, the “minimum of what the country lost through the Goldenberg Scam” totaled 37,463,616,294 KES which, at the time of the report (Oct 2005), exchanged at (0.0135226504 to USD) making the conservative total estimate $506,607,386.

According to Le Re?publicain of Mali (citing unnamed judicial sources) Drissa Keita, the former director of the Mali public Company for the Development of Textiles (CMDT), was accused of having awarded CMDT contracts for the delivery of packaging materials to three companies in clear violation of public rules regarding governmental contracts.

The involved companies would have received $4 billion FCFA (roughly $6m USD according to exchange rates in 2000, the period of alleged misconduct) had these contracts been honored.

Drissa Keita admitted to acting outside of his authority, being concerned with marketing the products of farmers in the CMDT zone, but claimed that the flagrant violation was still to the advantage of the local Malian peasants [Sic: from source, ‘paysans’ in French] whose interests he was charged with representing because it made it possible for them to sell goods amounting to a sum of two billion FCFA.

The criminal charges against the involved companies and Drissa Keita were resolved through mediation though the Le Re?publicain and some legal scholars questioned the legitimacy of such a resolution, debating whether or not such proceeding are allowed by statute in cases of alleged offences against public property. The involved parties claimed vindication, despite certain involved companies and Keita himself forfeiting a combined 115 million FCFA (roughly $220k USD according to exchange rates in 2008, the period of prosecution) comprised of deposits to the court that would typically be returned when those prosecuted are found innocent.

According to several media accounts -- ThisDay (Tanzania) Reports and accounts from Tanzanian Affairs from the Britian-Tanzania Society -- high level employees of Bank of Tanzania (BoT) authorized loans to and financed the operations of Meremeta Gold Mine Company, which was supposed to be operating the gold mine of that name until it went bankrupt. The now defunct gold firm was the beneficiary of more than $100m paid by the BoT to offset a huge loan from a South African bank. The debts and assets of this company were assumed by a new offshore entity TANGOLD, whose directors were all cabinet minister and BoT high level staff. The company existed to receive mining contracts and then joined in partnership with legitimate mining enterprises who would complete the actual mining business and return a share of profits. Beneficial ownership has been hard to determine- The legitimate partners have all claimed that the company referred to itself as a wholly state-owned enterprise, and some of the former directors who were also Public Official’s have claimed in inquiry that they thought they were conducting wholly above-ground transparent Ministry of Energy & Mineral Resources state business by their affiliation with Tangold (other sources conflict this, including the current BoT governor, who denies any sort of official Tanzanian involvement with the firm.) Balalli, used his position as BoT governor to keep pouring money from the State into Tangold. This scheme was further complicated by the involvement of a fictional, unregistered entity known as Deep Green Finance, which received large quantities of ongoing payments from BoT and Tangold, in a five month run up to the national elections. These payments were the only activity to Deep Green Finance's account, and were often (like many of the payments to Tangold) immediately withdrawn within 24 hours. The suggestion here (that illegal campaign finance activities may have occurred) coupled with the fact that inquiry and prosecution of this case has not been pursued with the vigor of the other BoT corruption cases from this time period, have led opposition leaders to demand independent inquiry into who possessed beneficial ownership of these accounts and entities. Prof Ndulu (current head of BoT) told 'The Citizen' over the phone that he was also told that Tangold was owned by the Government, but added that there was neither proof nor adequate information; it is not currently considered a BoT project.

According to Attorney General of Zambia v Meer Care & Desai (a firm) & Ors., the AG’s primary claim is aimed at three former Officers of Zambia namely the former President FJT, the former Director General of the Zambian Security and Intelligence Services (“ZSIS”) Mr XF Chungu (“XFC”), and a Mrs Stella Chibanda (“SC”) a senior Officer at the MOF. It is alleged that they were at the centre of the frauds and the claims against them are framed in conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty. The fraud alleged involves the transfer of MOF money to the Zamtrop account and from the Zamtrop account (inter alia) to the accounts of Access Financial Services Ltd a company providing financial services incorporated in Zambia (“AFSL”). The main controlling officers of AFSL were Mr Faustin Kabwe (“FK”) Mr Aaron Chungu (no relation to XFC) (“AC”) and Mr Francis Kaunda (no relation to the first President of the Republic Kenneth Kaunda) (“Francis K”).

According to the Report by the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Keeping foreign corruption out of the US: Four Case Histories.” dated Feb. 4, 2010, for ten years, from 1999 to 2009, Ms. Collins Bongo maintained a Collins Trust account at Fidelity Investments, maintaining Collins Trust accounts at HSBC from 2000 to 2003. Both financial institutions were unaware for years of her [Politically Exposed Person] status, her marriage to the Gabon Minister of Defense, and her association with the Bongo family of Gabon. “Their lack of awareness was due in part to her use of Collins, rather than Bongo, to open the accounts and carry out the transactions.” According to the Report, from 2000 to 2002, “Ms. Collins Bongo used her Fidelity mutual fund account like a checking account to move nearly $2 million among a network of accounts at other U.S. financial institutions. During the same period, she used her HSBC account to receive large wire transfers totaling nearly $650,000 from offshore locations, with no questions asked. When each financial institution finally took notice of an unusual transaction and examined the account activity, each quickly discovered Ms. Collins Bongo’s [Politically Exposed Person] status. One bank, HSBC, reacted by closing her account; the other allowed the account to remain open in light of the minimal funds remaining and lack of recent activity."

According to “Diamond Industry Annual Review” (Partnership Africa Canada, 2004), " ASCorp [Angola Selling Corporation] was established in 2000 to enhance compliance with UN sanctions, by providing a system that would tighten up Angola’s certificate of origin system, and ensure the exclusion of UNITA diamonds. The procedures were never fully implemented, however. They were monitored for their effectiveness by the UN, which ultimately concluded, in late 2002, that “existing controls fall far short of those envisaged for diamond purchases”. […] With the ending of ASCorp’s contract in 2004, control of exports has now passed to SODIAM, which will be the principal player in this aspect of Kimberley Process (KP) controls."

According to a study conducted by the Institute for Security Studies ("Inventory of formal diamond mining in Angola.”), "Angola Diamond Corporation (ADC) has the lowest profile of any mining company in Angola. The opaque nature of the company results from the fact that it is not known to have mined diamonds in considerable quantities and is allegedly linked to Isabelle dos Santos, daughter of President dos Santos, and former Endiama chief Noe? Baltazar. The company is rumoured to have multiple alluvial concessions in Lunda Norte, although this cannot be verified. The one concession to which ADC has been positively linked is a 60% interest in the Camatue kimberlite, with Endiama at 25% and IPE (SPE’s major shareholder) at 10%, with the remaining 5% “reserved for Angolan businessmen.” SML did not have the capital to develop the 70 metre deep kimberlite pipe south-west of Lucapa, and the concession was put up for tender instead. De Beers, SouthernEra and ITM reportedly bid for it, but it was awarded to ADC in late 1997. As it is doubtful that ADC has the capital for kimberlite development, this concession will probably be offered to a foreign mining consortium, with ADC retaining significant shares in the profits. Another Angolan company, Terramina, is reportedly associated with the Camatue pipe. This company, in turn, has been linked to Noe? Baltazar and is said to control Angola Diamond Corporation. Baltazar is also president-director of the new Angola Selling Corporation. It would seem plausible that these central figures would expand the holdings of Terramina or Angola Diamond Corporation, especially with the proposed reduction in all mining con- cessions to a maximum of 3 000 sq km. Reforms in the informal market, in which Baltazar seems to be a central Angolan figure, may largely reflect a greater centralisation of profits from joint ventures in formal diamond exploitation."
According to “Diamond Industry Annual Review” (Partnership Africa Canada, 2004), "Perhaps the most important issue relating to transparency and corruption recently has to do with reports that the President’s daughter, Isabel dos Santos, is a hidden shareholder in TAIS, one of the partner companies in ASCorp, and was said to be a shareholder in RDR, one of the main buying companies closed in 2000. Since TAIS is a Swiss company, its beneficial owners can remain hidden."

According to the study conducted by the Institute for Security Studies ("Inventory of formal diamond mining in Angola.”), "Leviev [Israeli/Russian diamantaire] has a diverse array of diamond and real estate holdings through various companies under his control such as Leviev International Diamonds, which in turn reportedly owns Ruis Diamonds, as well as Africa-Israel Investments Ltd. Arkaday Gaydemak, the reputed French-Israeli arms dealer, reportedly bought a 15% interest in the latter. This association has led diamond industry insiders to conclude that the new Sodiam/Ascorp diamond monopoly in Angola, in which Leviev is the premier foreign partner, has just as much to do with arms payments and oil interests as it does with diamonds. Leviev is also expanding his participation in the formal sector through Welox Ltd, reportedly associated with his group of companies. Welox recently entered into a deal to buy up to half of SouthernEra’s shares in the Camafuca kimberlite pipe."

According to The State v. Schabir Shaik and 11 Others (May 31, 2005 Judgment, June 8, 2005 Sentencing),"Shabir Shaik, advisor to then Minister of Tourism and later Deputy President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, arranged the payment of various expenses and debts owed by Mr. Zuma arranging that the payments would go through several of his companies. Shaik also solicited business joint ventures on the basis of his political access from this arrangement as well as procuring bribes to produce additional funding for Zuma which where also laundered through a series of companies and used to pay his debts directly or by routing them through a non-profit trust held by a prolific South African business man."

As stated in Attorney-General of Delta State & Ors. v. EFCC & Ors. (2007) (the sworn affidavit before the Federal High Court of Nigeria) an EFCC investigator declared: "I, Yahaya Bello, Male, Nigerian and Police Officer of 15A Awolowo Road, Ikoyi, Lagos State do hereby make oath and state as follows: […] The investigation carried out by the 1st Defendant [EFCC]’s team headed by me has revealed the involvement of Chief James Ibori and his accomplices in the following economic and financial crimes:[…] That investigation on share placements in Nigerian banks and companies revealed the diversion of N5 Billion from the accounts of the Delta State Government in Oceanic Bank and Zenith Bank for the purchase of Afribank shares for Chief James Ibori. The fraudulent transactions were perpetrated through the use of 14 fictitious companies such as Double Dip Nig. Ltd., Arusha Nig. Ltd., Abajim Nig Ltd., Lugba Nig. Ltd., Mombassa Nig. Ltd., Limpopo Nig. Ltd., Zaragoza Nig. Ltd., Sandton Nig. Ltd. etc. That the 1st Defendant’s/ Respondent [EFCC]’s intervention succeeded in putting a stop to the diversion of the funds to Chief Ibori’s private hands and recovered the said funds with even a benefit of capital gain on the investment. That the funds have since been returned to the coffers of the Delta State Government to enable the Government carry out valuable projects for the people of Delta State."

Saharareporters has reported on this case extensively from 2007 to present, with various article describing how former Governor James Ibori of Delta State used international collaborators, offshore shell companies and local assistants to buy a Bombardier Challenger jet from Bombardier Aerospace Incorporated, Canada’s leading private jet manufacturing company.

Mr. Gohil's most significant engagement with Ibori was over Telaton Quays Limited, another Mr. Gohil’s law firm incorporated Telaton Quays company that was registered in the British Virgin Islands and used to purchase a Challenger jet. Mr. Gohil also incorporated another company, Erin Aviation Limited, in Mauritius. Erin Aviation received an assignment from Telaton Quays Limited to help in the purchase of the Bombardier jet. The contract with Bombardier Incorporated was executed by way of a deed of assignment made on December 14 2006 between Telaton Quays Limited, Bombardier Inc. and Erin Aviation Limited. Saharareporters learnt that funds for the purchase of the $20 million Bombardier Challenger 604 jet were paid to the jet’s manufacturer through different shell companies around the globe. First, the sum of $4.7 million was transferred to Bombardier from a Mauritius-based Parabola International Corp through Mr. Gohil's firm, Arlington Sharmas in London. The money from Parabola originated from an account opened and maintained by James Ibori in Switzerland in the name of a company known as “Stanhope.” Further funds were transferred to Sharmas solicitors in London from a Lagos-based aviation company, Wings Aviation Limited, which owns the Beechcraft airliner that crashed into a thick forest in Cross Rivers state in March 2008. Gohil was the central figure in the Bombardier Challenger jet transactions. He incorporated Telaton Quays and was the authorized signatory in the deal to purchase the Challenger jet. According to the documents available to SaharaReporters, he is also known to have coordinated the purchase of the Challenger jet with Mr. Nogie Meggison, the director of Wings Aviation of Nigeria. Mr. Meggison, an air pilot, identified as a beneficial owner of Wings Aviation Limited, also provided $3 million through Mr. Gohil to Bombardier. In a due diligence letter to Bombadier Inc., Mr. Gohil described Mr. Meggision as a “well-known and respected” operator in the aviation industry. But Metropolitan Police investigators at the Proceeds of Corruption Unit (POCU) discovered that Wings Aviation is actually owned by Stanhope and Parabola through another unnamed parent company directly controlled by Mr. Ibori.

As stated in Attorney-General of Delta State & Ors. v. EFCC & Ors. (2007) (the sworn affidavit before the Federal High Court of Nigeria) an EFCC investigator declared: "I, Yahaya Bello, Male, Nigerian and Police Officer of 15A Awolowo Road, Ikoyi, Lagos State do hereby make oath and state as follows: […] The investigation carried out by the 1st Defendant [EFCC]’s team headed by me has revealed the involvement of Chief James Ibori and his accomplices in the following economic and financial crimes:[…] That investigation on Wings Aviation reveals an on-going transaction between the Aviation Company and Bombardier Inc. ( Canada) over the purchase of an air craft at the cost of USD 25 million for the personal use of Chief James Ibori. That payments were made to the UK Solicitors by Wings Aviation, Parabola International Corp (a Mauritius based company owned by a Zambian (Edward Shamutete) linked to Chief James Ibori), Copex Management Service, another Mauritius firm on behalf of Erin Aviation, Pamaron Oil and Gas etc. advertisement. That part of the money paid from Nigeria for the purchase of the aircraft was the USD 1 million Dollars paid to the Solicitors by Pamaron Oil and Gas Ltd from Fidelity Bank. That further investigation however revealed that the transaction was made on the order of Bi Courtney Ltd. through another company, Flodan Ltd. These two companies which moved money for Chief James Ibori by using another company, BIADOXE Ltd. as a disguise, are owned by the same person.”

According to Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Dariye and Dariye filed in London, “[o]n 16 December 1999, in Nigeria, Mr Dariye applied to the Abuja branch of Allstates Bank Pic to open an account in the name of "Ebenezer Retnan Ventures". Mr Dariye signed the application form as "Ebenezer Retnan", this name being an alias adopted by him. As he admitted to the Metropolitan Police in an interview on 2 September 2004, the Ebenezer Retnan account was his account. Mr Dariye did not register Ebenezer Retnan Ventures with the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission and he requested the management of the Allstates Trust Bank Pic to waive all account opening requirements beyond completion of the application form. The Ebenezer Retnan account with Allstates Trust Bank Pic was opened as account no. 2502012136 on 22 December 1999 with the first transaction taking place on 1 March 2000. Mr Dariye used the Ebenezer Retnan account to receive large sums from Plateau State, of which he was Governor. […] The Federal Republic of Nigeria will say that it is to be inferred that the bank balances accumulated by Mr Dariye in England [note: It being illegal for Nigerian public officials to maintain bank accounts or undeclared assets abroad] since May 1999 represent misappropriated public monies or secret profits obtained by Mr Dariye through the abuse of his position as a public officer in Nigeria. [… This specifically includes] (v) the diversion of about £2.6m in public funds from Plateau State to the Ebenezer Retnan account and of about £762,000 from there to the London accounts."

According to “'Kleptocrats' Portfolio Decisions or, realities in State Asset Recovery cases” by Tim Daniel and James Maton (“Kleptocrats’ Portfolio”), Diepreye Peter Solomon Alamieyeseigha was elected as Governor of Nigeria’s Bayelsa State in May 1999 and re-elected in 2003; he was impeached for corruption in December 2005. “Between the start of his period of office in May 1999, to late 2005, Alamieyeseigha accumulated (outside Nigeria) known properties, bank accounts, investments and cash exceeding £10m in value. His portfolio of foreign assets included accounts with five banks in the UK and further accounts with banks in Cyprus, Denmark and the United States; four London properties acquired for a total of £4.8m; a Cape Town harbour penthouse acquired for almost £1m, possible assets in the United States, and almost £1m in cash stored in one of his London properties. Some of the foreign assets were held in his name and that of his wife, but the bulk of them were held by companies and trusts incorporated in the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, South Africa, and Seychelles.” According to “Kleptocrats’ Portfolio”, these companies used to hold the assets were established and managed by third parties and trust and company service providers.

Alamieyeseigha's wealth derived from a combination of the theft of public funds, principally from the Bayelsa State Development Fund, and bribes paid by contractors for the award of public contracts by Bayelsa State. Evidence of the illicit activities was obtained during criminal investigations by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in Nigeria and the Metropolitan Police in London, in the form both of documents and witness statements from contractors and financial institutions.

“Kleptocrats’ Portfolio” concluded that, “Alamieyeseigha is a good example of co-ordinated international asset recovery. The case involved the full set of criminal and civil asset recovery mechanisms: criminal proceedings in Nigeria and the UK including criminal restraining orders over assets, requests for mutual legal assistance between these jurisdictions and others, criminal confiscation of assets in Nigeria, civil forfeiture of cash in the UK, private civil proceedings in the UK including a world-wide freezing injunction, enforcement of the civil judgment in Cyprus and Denmark, and civil forfeiture proceedings in South Africa."

Furthermore, according to Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Santolina Investment Corporation and ors., the case put forward by the Federal Republic of Nigeria in their civil recovery claim against Alamieyeseigha’s holdings in London, it is to be inferred that the bank balances, cash and other investments accumulated by Mr. Alamieyeseigha outside Nigeria since May 1999... represent bribes or secret profits obtained by Mr. Alamieyeseigha through the abuse of his position as a Public Officer in Nigeria. According to the court documents, Mr. Alamieyeseigha, among other things, persistently breached the constitutional prohibition against governors maintaining or operating bank accounts in any country outside Nigeria; had large discrepancies between declared assets and income and his undeclared assets; used offshore companies - and among those listed are S&P and Santolina - bank accounts in Cyprus and trusts in the Bahamas; used corrupt sources for the purchase s of the London properties; had a pattern of receipts on the bank accounts which is entirely consistent with the proceeds of theft or corruption and very difficult to reconcile with any ordinary business operation. According to the documents, there was absence of any plausible, legitimate means for Mr. Alamieyeseigha to acquire assets outside Nigeria on such a scale whilst properly discharging his duties as Governor and complying with his constitutional obligation not to hold any other executive office or paid employment in any capacity whatsoever.

According to "Role of media in curbing corruption: the case of Uganda under President Yoweri K. Museveni during the “no-party” system" (from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Working Paper No. 72), "The “junk helicopters” story was first broken by the New Vision in 1997. In April 1997, the Ugandan government signed a purchasing arrangement for four helicopter gunships from Belarus. The helicopters were to be supplied by a UK-based company called Consolidated Sales Corporation (CSC). When the initial batch of two helicopters arrived in Uganda, however, they did not meet the specifications of the contract and turned out to be junk.

The helicopters and the resulting lengthy dispute are estimated to have cost Uganda around USD 13 million. Major General Salim Saleh, the Minister of Defence at the time, confided in President Museveni, his eldest brother that CSC had offered him a bribe of USD 800,000 to help the deal go through. The contract price of each helicopter gunship was put at USD 1.5 million. Museveni ordered his brother to use the money in the war in northern Uganda. A judicial commission of inquiry was set up in 1999 to investigate the 1997 deal. In 2001, the judicial inquiry recommended that several officials, including Salim Saleh and Colonel Kizza Besigye, be tried for corruption. The director of Public Prosecution, Richard Butera, started independent investigations of Major- General Salim Saleh and Colonel Kizza Besigye, while the cabinet recommended the prosecution of army officers, businessmen and civil servants implicated by the judicial commission report. The cabinet also directed that implicated army officers should face an army court martial. The commission’s report was never made public or the findings of the court martial. After the report was submitted to the Ministry of Defence in August 2001, there was no follow up by the government. (Sunday Monitor, 2 September 2001, in Global Corruption Report 2003)"

Furthermore, according “Political corruption and the role of donors (in Uganda). [2005 Draft Copy]", "Perhaps one of the most compelling political corruption cases in Uganda’s recent past is the case of the purchase of the “junk choppers”. The case involved a decision taken by government in July 1996 to acquire four Russian Mi­24 attack helicopters from Belarus at a cost of US$1.5m each, together with subsidiary accessories, spare parts and ammunition. In addition, the government hired the services of several Belarus experts to train Uganda pilots in the operation of the helicopters.

The Ministry of Defence then entered into an agreement with the private company Consolidated Sales Corporation (CSC) to supply the helicopters. The Ministry was informed by the promoter of the corporation, Mr Emma Katto, that this was a British Virgin Island incorporated company. It came to transpire later that there were several illegalities committed in the procurement of the Mi­24 helicopters and a commission of inquiry was established to investigate the procurement process. The inquiry discovered that Consolidated Sales Corporation never actually existed at the time when the supply contract was signed with the Ministry of Defence. It was registered in Uganda (as a foreign company operating on plot 8/10 Kampala road) several moths after the contract for the helicopters was signed. It was also revealed that while CSC had described itself as the seller and supplier of the helicopters, it was a mere broker with no direct links to the supplier in Belarus. It was established as a profiteering company that purchased the helicopters from Belarus through a series of middlemen, and in turn sold them for a hefty profit.
The inquiry also revealed some startling information about corruption networks in Uganda. Mr Katto, the middleman, admitted that he had lobbied top army officials, including the Minister of Defence, Mr Salim Saleh (who is also the President’s younger brother). In a letter dated July 29,1996, Katto promised Mr Ruyondo a 10% commission on every contract that would be awarded to him by the Ministry of Defence, and that Salim Saleh was promised (and received) a US$800,000 commission for supporting the award of the helicopter contract. Salim Saleh later confessed to his big brother, the President, that he had received the bribe and the president advised him to give it to the army for special operations in the north. The commission of inquiry also got to know that the procurement transaction of the defective Mi­24 helicopters did cost the government US$ 3,495,955 in commissions (or bribes), US$ 2,342,241 meant for accessories, US$ 790,000 for the combined cost of commissioning services for the two helicopters and salaries and allowances of trainers, and US$ 216,000 for six expert salaries. The government also lost US$ 468,000 in food rations, medical care, and local/foreign travel for the experts and their families while in Uganda.

21The commission of inquiry recommended the prosecution of Salim Saleh along with the other individuals involved in the corruption scandal. The Cabinet furthermore endorsed this recommendation in a Government White Paper following the report, stating that “all officials of the Ministry of Defence, the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF), the Bank of Uganda or any other person implicated should be held accountable for causing financial loss to government or corruption”. The Cabinet also referred the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), while military personnel including the president’s brother implicated in the scandal were to be subjected to disciplinary action in accordance with the Army Statutes of 1992. The cabinet also ordered the Attorney General to lift the CSC corporate veil and proceed personally against Emma Katto, his wife, their overseas partners, Max Waterman, Chris Smith and others who offered the bribes to the army officials, including the president’s brother. However, contrary to the government stated stand on corruption, in early 2005, the Director of Public Prosecution withdrew charges against Salim Saleh for his role in the junk helicopters because he “could not find any evidence linking Salim Saleh to the to the junk helicopters scandal”. It should be remembered that Salim Salaeh not only confessed to his brother in private but that he subsequently acknowledged in public his receipt of the money during the commission of inquiry, which was a public hearing. The President also confirmed Saleh’s confession during the president’s testimony at the commission of inquiry.

In addition to the DPP dropping all the charges against Saleh, the Army Court Martial never laid any charges against him and the other army officials involved in the scandal. The only person who is still facing prosecution resulting from the helicopter scandal is Mr Katto, the supplier, but even he has not yet been convicted and he still enjoys a close relationship with the president’s brother and several other top government officials. Indeed, in an interview with the former Minster of Ethics and integrity, Hon. Miria Matembe on March 2, 2005, she is quoted as saying that the Government is using Katto’s prosecution as a gimmick to cover the tracks of the bigger individuals who were implicated in the purchase of the junk choppers. At least Saleh could have been successfully prosecuted on his own admission of receiving a bribe, which is punishable under the laws of Uganda."

According to "Role of media in curbing corruption: the case of Uganda under President Yoweri K. Museveni during the “no-party” system.” (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Working Paper No. 72) “[t]he UCB controlled over 80 per cent of the commercial banking market and had 62 billion shillings of bad loans. After the government signed the sale agreement with the South African Standard Bank of Investment Corporation (Stanbic), media reported that the Museveni family might have been involved in the deal. The Monitor first reported the story in 1994, stating that “the names behind UCB’s bad debts included some of the most famous and prominent politicians, soldiers, bankers and businessmen. Military officers collectively owed the bank at least Shs.281.25 million. That includes many RPF commanders. Some of the soldiers who ate the money are diseased” (The Monitor, 1994). A report from a select parliamentary committee on privatization established at the end of the 1990s eventually accused the Minister for Privatization, Matthew Rukikaire, of mishandling the government’s divestiture of the UCB. The report also alleged that General Salim Saleh, President Museveni’s brother, had engineered the improper takeover of 49 per cent of UCB shares through a firm in which he owned majority shares, Greenland Investments. The report also detailed millions of dollars of unsecured loans lent by the UCB after the take-over, including USD 4 million to companies in which General Saleh was a director (Tangri and Mwenda, 2001; Barkan, 2005). Under pressure from the parliament and the press, the president established a commission of inquiry to investigate the complex privatization process of UCB and the mismanagement of private sector banks. The inquiry led to the prosecution of the former managing director of Greenland Bank, Dr Sulaiman Kiggundu, who was sent to jail for six months."

According to “Political corruption and the role of donors (in Uganda). [2005 Draft Copy]", "It is important to note that this was not the first time that Salim Saleh has been involved in a high calibre corruption scandal in Uganda, and got away with it. He featured prominently in the botched sale of the then largest bank in Uganda, Uganda Commercial Bank. The sale of Uganda commercial Bank was part of the privatisation process of government owned enterprises, which started in 1991. Parliament suspended the privatisation process for a while when it learnt that Westmont Land, the successful bidder, was actually a “briefcase company” with no banking experience. It turned out that Salim Saleh had the majority shares in this company and that as soon as he had bought UCB, he sold its shares to Green Land Investments, another company in which he was also a major shareholder. Once again, Saleh, confessed to his brother the president to improper conduct and the president promptly forgave him. No prosecution was brought against him even though the government lost a lot of money on the botched privatisation process. The only person to be prosecuted (and to serve relatively long jail term) was Mr Saleh’s partner in the deal, Mr Kigundu, the former governor of Bank of Uganda."

Furthermore, according to the Parliament meeting on December 8th, 1998, (Parliament House, Kampala) that “Westmont Holdings, the Company which bid is not a Westmont Bank, rather via another of its companies, Westmont Land Asia, owns 40 per cent shares in Westmont Bank in the Philippines. Westmont Holdings is a privately owned Company and is not a listed Company in Malaysia. The Consultants, Morgan Grenfell point out in their Report, "Westmont Holdings is making a bid on its own, without participation of Westmont Bank. Therefore, information provided on Westmont Bank should be viewed by the Government solely in the context of Westmont Holdings experience as an active investor in a sizable bank". The Committee noted that despite this observation by the Consultant, PU went ahead to offer UCB to Westmont."

In the account of Le Segovien, it is stated that Diawara, former Director of the state-run Banque de l' Habitat Du Mali [BHM], was charged with embezzlement of 6,213,683,091 FCFA to the detriment of his institution with Ismaila Haidara, CEO of two implicated companies being charged with complicity and concealment. The court case is undecided at a final level at last available account.

The case centers around investment in a real estate project referred to as signed a financing agreement for construction of the so called "Mangueraie" ("Mango") real estate housing development project in Sebenikoro. During 2001, the West African Investment Corporation [WAIC] (a societe anonyme established in Mali in June 2001, owned mostly held by people of Malian nationality , and headed by accused accomplice Ishmael Haidara, a Malian citizen residing in Germany.) approached the Banque de l' Habitat Du Mali [BHM], headed by Diawara, through a number of real estate development companies, with IFA-BACO (a real estate development company in Mali) with which it has signed an agreement for the servicing of property deeds No. 1665, 1666 and 1704 that had been acquired by IFA-BACO with funding from the BHM. Diawara is accused of abusing his position at the BHM to cause dummy entries (by registration, cancellation, transfer and reinstatement, etc.) to credit funds to the accounts of this company, in defiance of orthodox banking practices, thus losing his institution the amount charged. In July 2003, the IFA-BACO invested roughly two billion FCFA into the project, paid entirely with domestic resources of the BHM, on behalf of WAIC, which BHM later refused to honor, objecting to financing the project on the grounds that the costs were overstated. Though there was no agreement that the BHM funds given on behalf of WAIC were guaranteed commitments Fonds de Solidarite Africaine (FSA), such an arrangement was presented by Diawara, arguing that the BHM was acting as an investor in real estate. By the accounting of Diawara and WAIC, moneys given to the company represented investments rather than loans which the BHM disputes. The BHM, alternately complains that the collusion between the two defendants caused it and other secured interests damages worth 7 billion FCFA.

According to the United States Security and Exchange Commission news release "Titan Corporation" (2005) concerning the case U.S .v. Titan Corporation, in 1998 Titan entered into a joint venture called 'Afronetwork, Benin' with the Benin company Afronetwork ("AFN") for the purpose of constructing a satellite telephone network in that country. Beginning in or about 1998, Titan and its subsidiaries embarked on a joint ventures with Benin to build and operate a wireless telephone network in that country. Part of Titan’s compensation for this project included a management fee worth millions of dollars. In order to secure and keep this business, Titan engaged the services of an agent who claimed to have close ties to the then-President of Benin (The Titan Benin Agent received all of his payments of approximately $3.5 million from Titan while he was a business advisor to the President of Benin). Beginning in 1999, without performing adequate due diligence to determine if its agent was complying with the FCPA, Titan began paying this agent hundreds of thousands of dollars for “consulting” services that were never properly documented or shown to have been performed. In or about January 2001, Titan began making improper payments to the Benin agent for the purpose of influencing the upcoming presidential election in Benin. Specifically, employees and agents of Titan agreed to pay millions of dollars to the Benin agent with the intent of supporting the then-incumbent President of Benin’s reelection campaign, under the guise of making “social payments” towards the betterment of the people of Benin. At the request of Titan, the Benin agent submitted false invoices to Titan totaling over $2 million for these funds, and Titan paid the bribes to the Benin agent in several installments between January 2001 and May 2001.

According to the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs report from the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ("Minority Staff Report. Hearing on Private Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities, Nov 9, 1999), "El Hadj Omar Bongo was accused of embezzlement of hundreds of millions of dollars of Gabon public oil funds. Omar Bongo was the president of Gabon for 42 years, and was a long-time private client of Citibank, who listed Bongo as “head of state, self made as a result of his position,” on his client profile. Citibank also noted that Bongo’s “country is oil producer.” Bongo held bank accounts in Gabon, London, New York, Paris, and Switzerland. The largest of these accounts was in the name of Tendin Investments. Bongo’s accounts have held over US$ 130 mil and he himself has been issued loans exceeding more than US$ 50 mil. Citibank has set up numerous companies in secrecy jurisdictions as well as opening a New York account in the name of “OS.”

Citibank was pressed by the Federal Reserve to produce documentation of the source of Bongo’s funds, their answer was “The Gabon Budget,” stating that “in 1995 the Gabon budget authorized $111 mil for President Bongo’s use.” Similar amounts were also “set aside” in ’96 and ’97. It is reported that Omar Bongo maintained 66 bank accounts, 183 cars, 39 luxury properties in France and grandiose government constructions in Libreville, Gabon. (The Senate Subcommittee staff did double-check the information with Gabon budget experts from the IMF and the World Bank. They were unanimous in their rejection of the Citibank memo, explaining that no Gabon budget during the 1990's had set aside funds for the President's personal use.)

Citibank documents show that bank officials were aware of news reports that Bongo was under investigation for possibly accepting bribes from French oil executives, but they were reluctant to raise those reports with Bongo or regulators, according to the draft report. Bongo has not been charged with any wrongdoing. A Citibank spokesman said bank officials believed that President Bongo's wealth came from legitimate sources and that he had been "considered a distinguished head of government, supported and embraced by U.S. presidents." Meanwhile, Citibank has moved to close Bongo's account, one of 40,000 at Citibank Private Bank. The closing of Bongo's account follows moves by the bank's senior management to tighten supervision of sensitive accounts and to keep the bank from being used for improper purposes."

According to the 2010 report "Keeping foreign corruption out of the US: Four Case Histories” from the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Feb 4, 2010), President Omar Bongo employed the services of Mr. Birrell (a U.S. lobbyist) to obtain, not only U.S.-built armored cars and U.S. government permission to purchase U.S.-built military transport aircraft to support his regime, but also use of Mr. Birrell’s U.S. corporate bank accounts. President Omar Bongo sent Mr. Birrell nearly $850,000 from the President’s own account in Gabon; another $17 million was sent from “Ayira” in Gabon. President Omar Bongo and his advisers then instructed Mr. Birrell to spend over $1 million in the United States to obtain and ship the vehicles, and wire transfer additional, substantial amounts to a variety of foreign bank accounts. Mr. Birrell participated in several suspicious transactions including sending $9.2 million to a President Omar Bongo account in the country of Malta, sending millions more to a Belgium bank account in the name of his senior advisor, and sending another $1 million to various “consultants.”EN1 These transactions must be viewed as suspicious because they enabled President Bongo to divert substantial funds from Gabon, move the funds through the international wire transfer system to accounts not openly associated with him, and make it difficult to trace the movement of such funds from Gabon to their final destinations. EN2

The Brenco International group of companies operated in conspiracy and to the benefit of President Dos Santos of Angola, at the behest of Pierre Falcone, in order to a) facilitate influence peddling by bribery to effect a change in French foreign policy to favor the Angolan government, b) to facilitate credit given in exchange for oil futures by French banks, and c) profit from the sale of illegal/overinvoiced/faulty arms and munitions to this government.

During 1993-1997 Pierre Falcone joined with Arcadi Giadamak to arrange Banque Paribas loans against Angola's future oil production, and the formation of ZTS-Osos a Slovakian company representing the interests of Falcone, Giadamak, the Brenco group, and Russian arms manufacturers in order to sell weapons to Dos Santos. ZTS-Osos received a $47 million dollar munitions and artillery contract in 1993, which was expanded by amendment to include further purchases worth $463 million and by late 1994 the total arrangement was worth $633 million. The money was routed through Pierre Falcone's Brenco International group of companies throughout the world in order to get these funds into France, which prohibits such arms deals by their citizens/companies.

When the incoming French government took interest in these dealing in 1997, the resulting pressure causing the ZTS-Osos arrangement to become untenable, so Falcone and Gaidamek actually set up another shell entity (Vast Impex), this time in Romania that allowed them to continue brokering these arms deals until Falcone's arrest in 2000. After this scandal broke and the French government began charging the relevant political and business figures with a variety of corruption and tax evasion charges, Dos Santos formally requested recognition of Falcone, Giadamak (who had signatory control over Angola bank accounts in Banque Paribas in France) as Angolan citizens and diplomats and attempted to discourage the prosecution of these figures in the interest of French-Angolan relations.

{The $990,000,000 is derived from the $633,000,000 in arms sales to Angola, the $135,000,000 loan by the Banque Paribas to Angola against oil futures, and the back taxes of $222,000,000 claimed to be owed by the French government}

According to US v Tesler & Chodan Indictment and the Nigeria House of Representatives Petition Committee, Interim Report (The Halliburton/TSKJ/LNG Investigation, Summary of Facts, Sept. 2004), $180m worth of bribes were paid to Nigerian officials in order to secure ~$6 billion in contracts related to the construction of LNG facilities on Bonney Island, Nigeria by TSKJ.

According to the U.S indictment of Tesler and Wojciech, TSKJ is a consortium jointly owned by KBR (USA), Technip SA (France), Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. (a subsidiary of Saipem SpA of Italy) and Japan Gas Co. of Japan. TSKJ consortium incorporated a subsidiary company called LNG services in Madeira (Portugal) through which illegal payments were allegedly made to Tristar in Gibraltar and to other persons linked to the LNG project. Put simply, the TSKJ consortium is a joint venture vehicle with three different companies. TSKJ (1), which deals with offshore procurement. TSKJ (2), which deals with onshore construction and TSKJ (3) otherwise called LNG services, which deals with offshore Engineering and management services. TSKJ (Nig) Ltd is a wholly owned subsidiary of TSKJ (2) but Tesler's company, Tri-star executed a contract with TSKJ (3). Meaning that Tesleris company Tri-star has no contract with TSKJ (Nig) Limited. The Contract Agreement between Tri-star and TSKJ (3) was later handed over to the committee by their solicitors.”

As stated in the US Department of Justice Press Release, “Former Officer and Director of Global Engineering and Construction Company Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Kickback Charges” (Sept 3, 2008), “LNG services entered into agreements with two companies, who contractually acting as "consultants," were then used as conduits for the bribes, one being used to route $132m to higher level Nigerian officials and the other used to route $50m to lower level Nigerian officials.” Furthermore, according to the Indictment U.S. v Albert Jackson Stanley, “Beyond just bribing the Nigerian officials, an executive of KBR, Albert Jack Stanley pled guilty to charges that he defrauded KBR as well, receiving approximately $10.8 million in kickbacks from one of the two consulting firms used in the bribe payment scheme.”

When General Abacha died unexpectedly in June 1998, the Nigerian government began looking into his family's wealth and billions of dollars of missing money that had been looted from Nigeria's treasury. With the corruption inquiry under way, Citibank got a request from one of the general's sons, saying he urgently needed $39 million from the London account, records show. But the money was in a time deposit that could not be redeemed for a while without a financial penalty, the staff report says. Citibank had long accommodated the Abacha family by setting up accounts with secret names like Gelsobella, Navarrio, and Chinquinto. So the private bank found a way to immediately transfer the $39 million and avoid the penalty, documents show. Citibank records one month later say the transfer was meant to be the first step in the closing of the account by the client. But last March, before the account could be closed, a London court issued an order in a civil suit freezing all accounts related to General Abacha. As a member of Citibank's Private Bank, citibank officials helped set up coded, and false named accounts and a shell entity to hold the proceeds of the late President's graft for his two sons. When it were found Abacha's three sons had channeled more than $110 million through Citibank accounts in London between 1988 and 1999, they were frozen by the British government.